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<v Danny Palmer>How do you take a screenshot</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>in a car?</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>You can take screenshots on a car if you press down the clutch pedal while inserting a thumb down the exhaust pipe. I think I'm not suggesting people try this.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>And also, you'd have to be a bit like Mr. Tickle to reach so far around.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Danny, another busy week in cybersecurity.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>All the stories, they just keep on coming, don't they?</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Loads of them. And I was away on a trip in Cornwall</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Smashing Security, episode 492.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>for the last few days as well, so I came back and</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>How Hackers Turned Russian Cars into Pumpkins with Graham Cluley and special guest Danny Palmer.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>checked what's happened. Turns out quite a lot.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Hello, hello, and welcome to Smashing Security episode 492.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>My name's Graham Cluley.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>We won't be talking about how Binance is warning users that an iOS flaw could</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>And I'm Danny Palmer.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>leak their crypto wallet secrets.</v>

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<v Unknown>You'll hear no discussion of—</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>How Donald Trump has chosen an executive from Palantir to head up the US</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>And we won't even mention—</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>How Wyndham Hotels exposed customer data after leaving a password inside the source code of its Android app.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>So Danny, what are you going to be talking about this week?</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>I'm going to be talking about how 3 men have been charged with using deepfake AI scams to steal millions</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>of dollars from companies around the world.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>And I'm going to be discussing how Russian cars are being turned into pumpkins — well, metaphorical pumpkins at least — and why a stranger on the phone is selling the owners their keys back. All this and much more coming up on this episode of Smashing Security.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Somewhere in your security team right now, there's a worker who's never slept, never taken a holiday, never once said, I'll leave this until Monday.</v>

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<v Joe>Is this about Geoff?</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>No, Joe, it's not about Geoff.</v>

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<v Joe>Because Geoff actually does sleep.</v>

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<v Joe>I've seen him do it.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>It's not Geoff, Joe. It's an agent.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Because your security team isn't just humans anymore. It's humans and AI agents working the same shifts, touching the same systems.</v>

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<v Joe>2 kinds of worker on the same team.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>And here's the question no one's asking in the budget meeting.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Do you actually know whether both of them can do the job?</v>

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<v Joe>You trust your analysts because they've got certifications, experience, a CV</v>

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<v Joe>you have interviewed against.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>And your agent?</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Got hired on a vibe after a product demo.</v>

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<v Joe>We've been letting</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Quite a lot's been going on, and we'll be talking about some of those things which have been going on this week, including</v>

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<v Joe>it mark its</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>some things which maybe haven't been making the headlines quite as much. But before we kick off, let's thank this week's wonderful sponsors,</v>

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<v Joe>homework this whole time.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>HackTheBox, Dropzone AI, and Vanta. We'll be hearing more about them later on in the podcast.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>And for the agents, HackTheBox lets you appraise them, test them against realistic cybersecurity work the way you'd test a new hire, and reappraise them because the model changes, the tools change, the environments change, and what was good enough to pass last quarter might not pass this time.</v>

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<v Joe>So your security team now has 2 kinds of worker.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>But do you actually know whether both of them</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>can do the job?</v>

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<v Joe>HackTheBox — develop your people, appraise your agents.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Find out more right now at smashingsecurity.com/hackthebox.</v>

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<v Joe>That's smashingsecurity.com/hackthebox.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Now, chums, imagine you find yourself in this situation.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>You've just bought yourself a rather lovely Chinese electric SUV, and you're driving it along, dumpty dumpty dum, singing a little song.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Is that your choice of music? You're driving along.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>That's what I like to —</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>I tune into Tumty Tumty Tum FM, as opposed to Tumty Tumty Tum Gold. Of course, I'm not so much into that era.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>This week on Smashing Security.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>But anyway, you're driving along. Suddenly, the dashboard goes completely dark, and you think, "Oh, this is no good." And you assume it's some kind of glitch because it's scary these days, isn't it?</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Driving a car and the electrics go. You think, "Oh, can I trust anything?" So you switch off the car and you switch it on again, and up pops on your dashboard a QR code.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>With a Chinese message telling you to reactivate your car, and you've got one of these newfangled cars, which of course has an app.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Oh, yes, please.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>This is where HackTheBox comes in.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>They help organisations build one connected cyber workforce strategy</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Yes, please is the obvious answer. But then they ask for 45,000 rubles. Which sounds like an awful lot — well, it is quite a lot.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>for humans and agents alike.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>It's $550. And this is happening right now to owners of Li Auto cars in Russia. Li Auto is a Chinese manufacturer of motor vehicles, and this is all according to a story in the Russian outlet Auto News.</v>

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<v Joe>For the humans, it's hands-on training, the real skills needed to</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>So here's how all of this works. The key to one of these cars isn't really a key at all. It's actually an account in the app.</v>

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<v Joe>secure AI systems and fight back against AI-accelerated threats.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Well, you do actually get this these days, don't you?</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>You get the ability to lock and unlock your car, or many cars these days, via an app, or turn on the heating.</v>

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<v Joe>Not slides, not theory — the actual job.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Yes.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Start the engine, and things like that. So if you control that account, the car thinks that you are the owner rather than maybe the genuine owner.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>So the criminals aren't hacking into the cars themselves. They're taking over the accounts.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>And those accounts with these particular cars are linked to a phone number. But you remember I said that these were Chinese SUVs?</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>That's right. And many of these cars have actually been hardcoded, it turns out, to require, at least for the app, a Chinese phone number.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>So these cars are often being grey imported into Russia and people are using them, but they don't have a Chinese phone number. So what they do is they rent those Chinese phone numbers online, often through a middleman.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>So there is a Chinese phone number connected to this, yes. Nobody yet knows how the criminals are breaking into these accounts, and even the owners who feel like they've done everything right to protect themselves seem to be getting hit.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>And this same scam of basically messing around with people's cars is not actually that new.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>It hit Li Auto owners in Russia last summer.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>So, Danny, is there anything which hackers aren't attacking at the moment?</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>I mean, we've seen freezers being attacked.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>We've seen blood banks being attacked.</v>

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<v Unknown>Yeah, I think that's quite a common trick by pranksters, I think you call them. As we've seen this week, so much is just connected now to the internet and everything is almost hackable.</v>

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<v Unknown>Cars have been connected to the internet in one way or another for at least a decade now. I seem to remember about 10 years ago, there was a story where some ethical hackers managed to, in a test environment, make an internet-connected car basically control the steering.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Oh my goodness.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>10 years ago, not much has changed apparently.</v>

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<v Unknown>There's more internet now on your car, so that's good.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Of course.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>So back in 2025, when these particular attacks first started against the Li Auto cars, the criminals were asking for about 250,000 rubles to get a car back.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>That's about $3,500.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>They've dropped their prices.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Well, they have. This is interesting, isn't it?</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>And you have it on your mobile phone. Of course.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>So the official fix through the dealers back then cost about 18,000 rubles, which is about $220. And some of those hackers were remotely opening windows and doors and starting engines, almost as if they were taunting the owners.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>And what you discover when you open the app is that your car isn't listed in the app anymore, so you're not able to re-enable it. And ten minutes later, your phone rings, and a stranger says, "Hello, hello, hello.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Like some sort of evil Brum.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>One for the kids there.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>I've got the digital key to your car. Would you like it back?"</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>I think you're going to have to explain</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>because Brum was kind of like a bit</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>like Chitty Chitty Bang Bang, wasn't he?</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>And he had headlights that looked like eyes and he went around</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>and had little adventures.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Yeah. Anyway, back last year, Russian owners were told how to protect themselves. They were told, look, register your Chinese phone number in your own name. Don't use a middleman. Keep it paid up. So keep on paying for the account. Don't let it expire in any way. Make sure that you don't lose control over that account because the number is what the car's digital key relies upon.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>The twist this year seems to have been that the attackers have moved on. So the car owners who followed the previous advice, they did everything right. You know, they paid for their Chinese phone number, they registered it in their own name. They're still being hit. And the ransom demand has, as we mentioned, it's crashed in price. So previously, rather than the equivalent of about $3,000, they're asking for $550 instead after they've been immobilised. So I'm always kind of encouraged when the cybercriminals think, oh, market forces, bloody hell, we're gonna have to lower our prices. I mean, that's got to be good news, hasn't it?</v>

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<v Unknown>You'd hope so, because with things like ransomware, it's just been going the other way, is it?</v>

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<v Unknown>I remember when ransomware cost you £500 for an attack, and now you're lucky if it's £5 million.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Yes. So a story where it's actually reducing is good, but still, your screen on your car is going dark, the climate control stops. Some drivers are saying they can't start their engines at all. Others say that they could still run the car if they used an old-fashioned physical key.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>My goodness, who starts a car with a key? I think it's a bloody good idea if you keep your key, to be honest. As far as all the reports I've heard, nobody's car has been driven away. But if they are able to remotely unlock it, I suppose there is the possibility if they work out where it's physically located, they could go round and pinch it as well.</v>

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<v Unknown>That is a very interesting concept. Yeah.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>But often it's just left sitting there like an expensive paperweight. One of the Russian headlines actually said it's kind of like being turned into Cinderella's pumpkin. So how are the hackers doing this? Well, nobody knows. The founder of the Owners Club thinks the attackers are looking up the VIN, the vehicle identification numbers, in leaked insurance documents and databases to find the owners. He thinks it's unlikely to be a lone hacker because of the need for all of these Chinese SIM card details, the leaked data, and of course, having people to do the ransom negotiation.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>But reports are also saying that these attacks are mostly happening at night. So it could be just someone's side hustle, for a bit of extra cash. I don't know. The victims, though, they say that Li Auto aren't being helpful. They say the phone number providers aren't being any help either. The company itself, they say they're building a fix that swaps out the requirement for a Chinese phone number for an email address.</v>

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<v Unknown>I mean, that seems like a no-brainer really, because if you bought one of these cars in another country and you have to set up a Chinese phone number on</v>

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<v Unknown>a Chinese phone, that seems like a lot of extra steps.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>I wonder if it was an attempt to prevent too much grey importing, to have a little bit more control over who might be selling the cars, to make sure that you went through official distributors instead of— I don't know.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>I don't know what their thinking was.</v>

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<v Unknown>No, we're not experts on the Russian or Chinese</v>

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<v Unknown>auto industry here.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Yes, you'll have to listen to another very niche podcast for that, I suspect. Anyway, the advice, of course, is don't pay because paying doesn't actually guarantee you get access back to your car. It looks like dealers are actually able to do this for less money than the blackmailers are requiring.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>But you should be reporting it to police. And the other piece of advice that's just been given is take screenshots. I guess as evidence as to what's happened.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>So they get in the car</v>

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<v Unknown>How would you</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>by turning on the app.</v>

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<v Unknown>take a screenshot</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Is that like their keys, basically?</v>

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<v Unknown>in a car?</v>

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<v Unknown>Or is that screenshot</v>

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<v Unknown>on the app?</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>And they had some control over things. So if a buyer of the car fell behind on their payments, the dealer could actually remotely stop the car from starting and could even set off the horn. So then repossession agents could find the car and retrieve it.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>While annoying all your neighbours at the exact same time.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Yes. But from the car dealership's point of view, really handy. Until, of course, the wrong person got hold of the password.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>And one day what happened was that more than 100 owners of these particular cars found their cars wouldn't start. And in the middle of the night, all over Austin, horns were going off, which is obviously quite a problem. And some owners were disconnecting their batteries just to get some sleep.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Yes, I imagine. And if any of those owners had dogs or their dogs nearby, they wouldn't like it.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>They'd start barking.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Right. Anyway, it turned out a 20-year-old who'd lost his job at the dealership.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>This is a familiar story, isn't it? Logged back into the system using a password and went down the customer list.</v>

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<v Unknown>Password still password1 as well, I assume.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>All too common. It's that or they haven't reset the password. Now, interestingly, the criminals aren't the only ones with access to the car's off switch of these Li Autos. In May 2025, Li Auto's Russian distributor said it was considering remotely blocking the screens of cars.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>So they were actually thinking of doing it if those cars had been brought in via grey imports again. So they don't like the idea of these cars being imported into Russia on the sly. And so that summer, Russian dealers claimed that a firmware update was turning some grey import Li Auto cars into bricks.</v>

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<v Unknown>Interesting.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>And they worked on an unblock tool to deal with that. So it's pretty tough being the owner of one of these cars in Russia. On one side, you've got a manufacturer who's talked about switching off your screen.</v>

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<v Unknown>With the Chinese</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>On the other hand, you've got criminals who are stealing your digital keys. It's causing all sorts of nuisance. Danny, should manufacturers of anything hold the ability to turn off your device remotely, do you think, on something you've bought?</v>

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<v Unknown>messaging on the</v>

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<v Unknown>No.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Sounds like it's asking for trouble. It's the way things are. It's annoying. You don't really need to own anything these days. I mean, my wife recently passed a driving test and bought a car, and it's a Mini, and it's pre-smart stuff.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>We're not having these problems here, but it's just — this whole thing's like people say, oh, you got your internet-connected fridge and it tells you when your milk's about to run out. Well, I could do that myself by looking in the fridge. There's been a few cases where PlayStation games, the company's gone, oh wait, no, we're taking this game offline now. Then all your stuff is gone.</v>

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<v Unknown>app as well.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Yeah, I guess so.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>You don't too much, do you?</v>

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<v Unknown>Yeah.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to Alert Quiz. Our contestant today is Joe.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Joe, are you ready?</v>

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<v Joe>I think so.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Right then. Question 1 for</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>10 points. What is a security alert?</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Correct!</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Question 2: give me an example.</v>

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<v Joe>Someone's lost their lanyard?</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Oh dear, oh dear, oh dear. Answers I would've accepted include an odd sign-in from abroad or someone clicking a dodgy-looking email. Question 3: what does each alert need before anyone knows that it matters?</v>

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<v Joe>Crumbs.</v>

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<v Joe>A person pulling evidence from several different tools.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Correct!</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>And when there are more alerts than hours in the day, some of them—</v>

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<v Joe>Get ignored?</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Correct! Right, bonus question.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>I was reading a report today</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>What is Dropzone AI?</v>

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<v Joe>Ah, I know this.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>of electronic billboards being breached to</v>

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<v Joe>It's a collective of specialised AI agents that investigates every alert start to finish around the clock using the tools your team already has.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>10 bonus points. And what do analysts get when they run Dropzone AI?</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>show porn. What's going on?</v>

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<v Joe>A vague something's up?</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>It was live action back in the '90s and there was a</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>No, Joe, that's what they get now. With Dropzone AI, they get a finding with the reasoning and evidence already assembled. It shows its work. So checking a finding becomes a decision rather than a second investigation. And who decides where the agents stop?</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>model car. It was like an old style, you know, 1920s, '30s car.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>The agents?</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>No, Joe. The team decides where the agents stop, and the analysts own every verdict. Now, final, final question. Finish this quote. Kevin Turnbull, global IT director at Asala Energy, says, with Dropzone, we don't get, this is a problem. We get—</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Yes.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>With Dropzone, we don't get, this is a problem.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>We get, this is a problem, and here's why.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Huzzah! Correct, Joe.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>You have won the self-guided demo, and what's more, so has everyone who's listening. To watch a real investigation unfold, go to smashingsecurity.com/dropzoneai.</v>

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<v Joe>That's smashingsecurity.com/dropzoneai.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>You can take screenshots on a car.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Dropzone AI, reinforcements have arrived.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>If you press down the clutch pedal while inserting a thumb down the exhaust pipe — I'm not suggesting people try this.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>And also you'd have to be a bit like Mr.</v>

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<v Joe>Nice demo, but can I swap it for a car?</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Tickle to reach so far around.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>No, Joe.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Danny, what's your story for us this week?</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>As much as I am loath to admit it, when there are still so many issues around cybersecurity which come down to the basics not being done, it's impossible to ignore how the rise of AI has had an impact on cyberattacks.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Because, you know, who would have predicted that cybercriminals would almost immediately latch onto a new technology to do bad things?</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>As if.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>As if. Yeah. I mean, imagine the internet being used for crime, let alone write better, more convincing phishing emails or use ever more readily available deepfake tools to pose as celebrities, CEOs, and other well-known individuals to trick people, right? Who'd have thought that could be a thing? Not possible. Alas, it is the case. And last year alone, it's estimated that fraudsters used audio and video deepfakes to successfully steal over $1.5 billion in total. And that's just the cases we know about.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Hang on, this is just by deepfake audio and video?</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Yep, just by deepfakes, $1.5 billion.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Wow, that is astonishing, isn't it?</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>I didn't know it was at that kind of scale.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Yeah, that's just last year. It's likely going to be more this year as well. So yeah, it's tricky out there.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>And one of the most common methods of this is known as CEO fraud, which I'm sure listeners of Smashing Security don't need me to explain. But just in case, as a quick rundown, as the name suggests, it sees scammers using AI deepfakes to look or sound like the CEO, an executive, or someone else important at a major company, call up another executive or an employee with the voice and the face of the person they're impersonating and say, oh, could you make this urgent business transaction please to this bank account? I mean, it's essentially the evolution of the old business email compromise attacks, which, you know, are very lucrative in themselves.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Except in this case, they're not just using email to coerce employees into making payments — they're also using the audio and video as well. Often these requests come with claims that, oh, it's a secret but important deal, so you must not tell anyone about this in order to make sure it goes through. There are two things here that make these work.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>One is often they work because they're deepfakes of CEOs and other public figures who by their very nature are public-facing, so audio and video of them speaking is out there.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>And attackers can use that information to do that. I mean, someone could audio deepfake us. Imagine.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>The thing is, I'm sure most of our listeners know this, but they are</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>astonishingly convincing these days.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>I suppose screenshot of any messages you might receive, but maybe just a photograph.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>They've really changed from just the last few years ago. I saw something a friend of mine posted on LinkedIn — he was doing some work and he posted a deepfake of himself he'd made.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>A shot of the screen in your car, yes, perhaps.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>I've known this guy for 30 years and I couldn't tell the difference, which was scary.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>If a remote off switch for a car sounds like a brand new problem, it isn't.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Yeah. I was over in Portugal the other week doing a cybersecurity</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>For instance, back in 2010 in Austin, Texas, there was a dealership there which fitted some of its cars with a little sort of GPS box.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>awareness event for an organisation, and what they decided to do was</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>they put up a video of the CEO.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>And she was apologising for not being able to be there in person. First of all, it seemed like a very standard kind of message. And then she said, oh, while I'm here, I also want to tell you the new rules regarding the use of the coffee machine.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>And it got more and more absurd over time with the things that she was saying, and people began to twig in the audience, hang on, this can't really be her. And then she came out from behind the scenes, but it had been completely and utterly faked. It was amusing, but it could have so easily been convincing and used for this kind of fraud.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Yeah, that's the problem with this now. A lot of this technology is so convincing, even just compared to a few years ago. A lot of the software out there to be able to make it is more easily available, it doesn't take as long. I mean, even just a few years ago, apparently it'd take a good few days to make a convincing deepfake. Now you can do it basically instantly. But yes, one of the key problems here with this type of CEO fraud attack is that you mentioned the big boss there. If the big boss calls you and says, can you do this? Most people aren't going to want to get in trouble for not doing an important task or questioning their boss. So with all this in mind, this week the United States Department of Justice unsealed an indictment announcing that 3 men have been charged with stealing over $100 million from companies that they defrauded with the aid of deepfakes. 2 of the men were arrested in Spain, and one was arrested here in the UK, which shows this is a global problem as well. You can steal from anyone anywhere nowadays. The US Department of Justice put out a press release on this. In it, they refer to AI as superintelligence and SI, but I'm going to choose to ignore that because that's just ridiculous, isn't it?</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>They're really trying, aren't they? They've got to keep the boss happy.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Again, this is actually evidence of what we've just been talking about. If the boss says something stupid, in many organisations, people think, well, we've got to go along with it, haven't we?</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Excellent idea, sir. Yes.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>I'm saying AI instead of what they say, because it makes more sense to most of us.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Oh.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Okay. Yes.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Speaking when the indictment was unsealed, US Attorney James McDonald said the accused abused groundbreaking technology to impersonate real people and deceive executives into</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>sending them and their co-conspirators approximately $129 million, which obviously is quite a lot. I'm not going to try and work out percentages of</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>that $1.5 billion figure we mentioned earlier, but it's quite a significant chunk of that, really.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>So how do the attacks operate? Well, to begin with, the attackers used deepfakes to pretend they're the CEO of a company, and they called employees to say that, oh, I need your help with these confidential transactions.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>So that could have been over the phone, or could have been on Teams or any other video call as well.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Hmm.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>The fake CEO would then tell the employee</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>to contact lawyers at a real large international</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>law firm to help conduct the deal.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Because everyone can trust lawyers, right? They know what's going on. But guess what? Those lawyers were fake too.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Also, they were deepfaked as well.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>I don't know if they actually deepfaked lawyers because it doesn't actually mention that, but the people on</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>the line were pretending to be lawyers.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Okay. It could just be a criminal call centre or something like that. Right. Okay.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>But these people on the line would provide the victim with the information on how to make the transaction, which sends the money to a bank</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>account owned by the fraudsters. And I guess the problem here is for the victim organisations, by the time they've realised something was wrong, the money</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Yeah. It's annoying for consumers that this is happening and even more so in the physical realm, I suspect.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>is already long gone, and $130 million stolen from victims across the United States and the wider world.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>That's a significant chunk of coin for allegedly three guys running this scam. So according to the US Department of Justice, some of the most lucrative attacks in this case — oh, here's some examples.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>One resulted in over $5 million being stolen from a pet food company based in Florida. The same amount was stolen from a hospital and healthcare group in Missouri.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>What has me thinking in this story is there seems to be no indication as to who is conducting this</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Right.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>campaign either, which is interesting because you don't often hear about cyberattacks targeting targets in Russia.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>The attackers also managed to steal $3 million from another hospital group and $2.5 million from a bank in Rhode Island, which I find interesting that they</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>got more from the pet food company than a bank.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>No, I suppose banks typically have more security policies and tests and checks in place, and maybe there's more limits.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>You'd like to think that they're more experienced about defending against all kinds of fraud and theft.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>No.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Yeah.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>The victim which the attackers stole the most from was from what's described as a financial technology company here in the UK, which lost over $11.5 million to the scammers, which works out in pounds £8.5 million, which is not an insignificant amount of money at all, is it?</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Wow. Can you imagine being that employee who was duped?</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Are they going to still have a job after that?</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>It's a tricky one, isn't it?</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Just because, you know, if they really thought they were speaking to their CEO, it's hard.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>I know, I know. But if word got round the company, the staff would obviously find out that there'd been a big scam going on inevitably.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>And even if the company was very gracious and said, look, we're not going to name who it was, you would feel it on your shoulders, wouldn't you?</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>I think something to consider here as well is these are large amounts of money, but it seems that the authorisation to make these payments just can be done by one person, which is maybe something to be looking at.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>That's $11.5 million stolen from a fintech company in the UK, which has not been a good few weeks really for financial technology and cryptocurrency firms.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Oh yes.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>The Binance hack,</v>

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<v Joe>This episode of</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>for instance. Yeah, absolutely.</v>

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<v Joe>Smashing Security is</v>

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<v Joe>sponsored by Dropzone AI.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>But not got the best background, potentially.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Bit of a sticky wicket for them to begin to defend that chap from.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Despite the apparent anonymity the internet offers cyber fraudsters, it does always seem to be</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>hubris and boasting which plays a part in them getting caught.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>I don't think he was posing with wads of cash in front of a Lamborghini, this one.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>That's why some people get caught, isn't it?</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Because they'll boast on the Discord channels and that</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>sort of thing, even if they're using a pseudonym.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>There's always something you can track someone down with. But yeah, hubris gets you caught.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Thank goodness.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>But I think this whole case is a reminder that AI technology like deepfakes — they're getting increasingly more powerful, hard to tell what is real and what is not, as their creators seemingly continue to put new, more advanced versions of these out into the world without really thinking about the consequences of doing that.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Oh, look, we can make these super powerful deepfakes, or look, our AI can now hack governments.</v>

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<v Unknown>Have you really thought about if this is a good idea, putting this out there for everyone to use? But that's another story. But yeah, it's becoming more difficult to identify the fakes.</v>

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<v Unknown>There are companies out there which say they can use technology to help businesses detect deepfakes. But even as technology gets more powerful, it's still often the human which is the last line of defence.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>There was a story a while back about fraudsters who used deepfake phone calls to pose as a company executive of an auto manufacturer — in fact, call another member of the leadership team to try and trick them into making a major financial transaction. The person on the receiving end said, okay then, what was the book you recommended to me last week?</v>

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<v Joe>It's a flag</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>The attacker didn't know the answer to this, so the attack was thwarted. So it was just a simple little human interaction.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Yes.</v>

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<v Joe>that something might be wrong.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>I think some of the advice that these companies give — like, do have those little backups, have those little phrases or questions to ask to just double-check things. I mean, that might be difficult for an employee who feels like they're questioning their boss, but no, that's exactly what the attackers want. They want the victim to feel they don't have any power to reject the request and transfer the money.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>So you are saying that you could say to your boss, for instance, yeah, just before I transfer that $10 million, can you remember precisely what happened at the Christmas party?</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Didn't you spill something over my jacket, or you insulted me in some fashion?</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Yes, exactly that sort of thing. At a time when the technology is getting more powerful, it is still the little human intuition and connections that can help us defend against these.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>It's going to become more important as deepfakes continue to evolve. And I'm sure we'll probably end up seeing that they cost even more than $1.5 billion this year as the problem keeps going.</v>

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<v Unknown>So yeah, fingers crossed for anyone out there and just be careful who might be telling you to do the thing. And maybe Tom Cruise doesn't want you to transfer all that money to invest in some new cryptocurrency.</v>

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<v Unknown>This episode of Smashing Security is sponsored by Vanta.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>It's 2 AM. Somewhere, a security team is drowning. Graham, the spreadsheets. There are so many spreadsheets. Vendor risk assessments unread.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Audit evidence scattered like ash in the wind. You've filled out the same questionnaire 4 times this week, Graham. 4 times! Some men choose to face this alone, but not tonight.</v>

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<v Joe>Okay, Graham, this is a bit much.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Yeah, fair point. Anyway, Vanta — thank God. Vanta's a trust management platform that automates the mind-numbing stuff that makes you want to poke your eyes out with a fork. No more manual evidence chasing, no more questionnaire hell.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>It continuously monitors your systems and keeps you audit-ready for SOC 2, ISO 27001, HIPAA, GDPR, the works. And it uses AI. Yes, Joe, it does.</v>

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<v Joe>To flag risks and streamline evidence collection so your whole security programme stays in shape, not just the week before an audit.</v>

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<v Unknown>Yeah.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Yes.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>No more 2 AM dread. No more spreadsheet purgatory. Just peace.</v>

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<v Joe>And $1,000 off if you demo</v>

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<v Joe>it right now.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>$1,000?</v>

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<v Joe>vanta.com/smashing.</v>

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<v Unknown>Yeah.</v>

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<v Joe>Go now before it's too late.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>That's vanta.com/smashing.</v>

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<v Joe>And thanks to Vanta for supporting the show.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>And welcome back, and you join us at our favourite part of the show, the part of the show that we like to call Pick of the Week.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Pick of the Week.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Pick of the Week.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Pick of the Week is the part of the show where everyone chooses something they like. Could be a funny story, a book that they've read, a TV show, a movie, a record, a podcast, a website, or an app. Whatever they wish. It doesn't have to be security-related necessarily. Well, my Pick of the Week this week is not security-related. My Pick of the Week this week is a TV show. I know some people will know from last week's episode that I've hurt my back a little bit. And so there's been a bit of TV being watched to try and distract myself from the pain.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Right.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>And I've been watching a TV show called Lupin. It is a French TV show, the télévision, and it is about— I wish I hadn't started doing this French accent now. You've committed now. Okay. It is a man. He set out to avenge his father who was accused of stealing a necklace, an incredibly valuable necklace. And that happened years and years ago when he was a little boy. And it had a huge impact upon the rest of his life.</v>

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<v Unknown>Oh.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>And in the first episode, as a grown-up man, he ingeniously steals the necklace himself from the Louvre. And it's a great fun show. He is apparently inspired by a fictional character called Arsène Lupin, who is a gentleman thief and master of disguise. And it turns out this Arsène Lupin character, there really are books.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>These books exist. They were written by a chap called Maurice Leblanc. This came out in the early 1900s, and they're sort of like the cornerstone of the TV show. The TV show's full of action, it's full of heists, it's full of disguises, all sorts of shenanigans going on.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Is the TV show set in the modern day then, or is</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>it a period piece?</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Oh yes, sorry, I haven't explained that. The TV show is set in the modern day, but this guy's a huge fan of the books, and they have inspired him and influenced his life in how he lives. And he's the hero of the show because he's getting away with all these things, but he has actually got a good cause. It's not as though he's doing these things to profit himself. He's actually righting wrongs with his thievery, with his pickpocketry, and his ability to inveigle his way into organisations.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>So it's all really entertaining stuff. And by the way, in the books, apparently in an early one of these books in the early 1900s, Sherlock Holmes appears. And what apparently happened is that Arthur Conan Doyle or his publishers or something weren't very happy about Sherlock Holmes appearing in someone else's books. And so Maurice Leblanc, who was writing these books, apparently changed the character's name to Herlock Sholmes.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Sorry.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Which for someone who claimed to be the master of disguise was maybe not— taking the mickey a bit, was Maurice Leblanc. But anyway, the TV show has now— I've only watched the first series. It's up on Netflix and elsewhere. But there are 4 series so far. The 4th series has just been put out and it's good fun. I love a show with subtitles anyway, because I feel like—</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>I was going to ask that. Is it a French production with the subtitles on it? Yes.</v>

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<v Unknown>Yeah.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>That's the only way — you can't watch dubbed things. You have to watch them with subtitles. I mean, I watch English things with subtitles, so I've got no problem watching a French thing with subtitles. It's called Lupin, L-U-P-I-N. Go and check it out.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>I guarantee you'll have a fun time. It's a good fun watch. And that is my Pick of the Week. Danny, what's your Pick of the Week?</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>My pick of the week is not cybersecurity related. I guess it's sort of related in a way, actually, weirdly. It's a video game. It's called Two Point Museum. It isn't new. It first came out last year, but the premise is it's a management sandbox game where you're building a museum.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>So yeah, it was the bank with its traditional security which had the least stolen from it, I suppose. But anyway, those charged, if they're convicted, they'll be facing significant jail time.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>I love those kind of management games where</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>you're building things.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>And I believe all of them are currently waiting for extradition to the United States. Now, we're all innocent until proven guilty, but I suggest things might not be looking great for the defendants because, according to the court documents, one has previously boasted about being involved with money laundering — laundering hundreds of millions since 1994.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Yeah. So you employ the staff, the security guards to stop thefts of necklaces and things as well. The burglars all come in. You know, when they're detected, they are wearing black and white striped things with swag on and that sort of thing.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>He's also previously convicted of fraud in 2008. I mean, innocent until proven guilty.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>You find museum relics and artifacts, learn more about them in order to build the best museum possible, while also making money doing it. It's by British game developers, Two Point Studios. It's very silly and it's kind of got a cartoony style and it's very Monty Python in the way it does humour.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Okay.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>These are just some of the randomly generated names for some of the museum employees and visitors in a game I was playing last night. One of the visitors was called Horatio Fingers. One was called Clementine Slime. And then Lionel Mayonnaise also came to pay a visit. I just love all the stupid names.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>So it's good-natured, silly fun, as were the two previous titles by the studio, which were Two Point Hospital and Two Point Campus, which had you managing a hospital and university respectively. Some of the team behind Two Point Museum and the other Two Point games worked on Theme Park and Theme Hospital back in the 1990s. Fun fact, the lead programmer of Theme Park was a name listeners to Smashing Security might recognise. It was one Demis Hassabis, who at 17 was the lead programmer of Theme Park, but he left Bullfrog to go to Cambridge University to study computer science. Then went on to found some company called DeepMind or something.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>What a great trivia fact. That's fantastic.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>You know, that's a really good point because so often I hear about these hacks and sometimes they make the national newspapers. We're seeing at the moment that there are all these hoax bomb threats going through to airlines. Planes are being diverted and things.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Apparently he initially started working there even younger. He won a competition to basically get a job at a game company in the early '90s. Getting a job was easier back then, I guess. But that's probably the reason I love this. It's nostalgic. It's fun.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>It's quite relaxing. There's no real jeopardy in it. It's just a nice time and it's my pick of the week. So that's Two Point Museum developed by Two Point Studios, which is published by Sega. Which is why there's a bunch of Sonic the Hedgehog stuff in my museum. And it's available on PC, PlayStation, Xbox, and Nintendo consoles.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>And I'm always thinking, firstly, what is the point of this? But also, it's not as though you can really boast about it to your mates. It's not as though you can say, oh yeah, that was me who wrote that particular worm, or that was me who stole $6.5 billion from this company.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Absolutely.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Sounds good fun. And that just about wraps up the show for this week.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>You know, even in your hacking circle, you've got to be really careful. And it must eat away inside at you thinking, you know, oh, I did this thing, but I can't really tell anyone about it. At least it's not going to be safe if I do.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Thank you so much, Danny, for joining us. Where can folks find you online and follow you to learn what you are up to?</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>All the usual social media places, as expected. Bluesky, LinkedIn, that sort of thing.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>One thing I probably should mention is—</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Oh, you're on Substack now, aren't you?</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Yes, annoyingly stereotypical of a freelance writer. Yeah, I set up a Substack which I called Lingua Cyberneticus.</v>

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<v Unknown>Like a hacker name, that account</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Now when I'm saying it out loud, it's probably not that easy to Google. Or you can just find me on social media because I'm spamming links to it like there's no tomorrow at the moment.</v>

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<v Unknown>will be able to trace to</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>Good man.</v>

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<v Unknown>an email account, et cetera, et cetera.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>I'll be at various cybersecurity shows coming up here in London over the next few weeks.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>So yeah, say hi if you see me, I guess.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>And of course you can find me, Graham Cluley, on LinkedIn, Bluesky, Mastodon, Instagram, and even on the talk of TikTok. The list goes on, or follow Smashing Security on Bluesky, Mastodon, or Reddit. And don't forget to ensure that you never miss another episode. Follow Smashing Security in your favourite podcast app, such as Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and Pocket Casts.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>The episode show notes, sponsorship info, guest lists, and the entire back catalogue of 492-ish episodes. Check out smashingsecurity.com. Until next time. Cheerio, bye-bye.</v>

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<v Danny Palmer>Bye everyone.</v>

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<v Graham Cluley>You've been listening to Smashing Security with me, Graham Cluley, and a huge thank you to Danny for joining me this week, and of course to this week's sponsors, Dropzone AI, Hack the Box, and Vanta. Also thanks to Joe for helping out with the ads. And not being too upset whenever someone writes in accusing him of being an AI. He's not an AI. Joe does really exist. And huge thanks to the delightful Amanda, who did 95% of the editing this week because of, well, you know, I mustn't keep boring you with stories of how I've done something terrible to my back. Oops, there I go again. Anyway, seriously, thanks to all the listeners who dropped me a line about it with their suggestions of what medication I should or should not be taking, what stretch exercises I absolutely must do or absolutely must not do, many of which intersected to add to the challenge. But it really is lovely to know there are so many kind folks out there prepared to share their war stories of sciatica. And speaking of lovely people, huge thanks to these brilliant Smashing Security patrons who I plucked out of the hat this week. The effortlessly cool Jane with a Y — I mean, the Y is in the middle of her name, not at the start. Otherwise, she'd be a Yane. Vladimir Jirasek, the kind of name that would strike fear into me at a chess tournament. Ragnar Karlsson, normally found captaining a longboat along the crinkly coastline of Scandinavia. Skadone, whose name reads like a cryptic crossword clue. Heisenberg, either a physicist or a drug kingpin, or maybe both. We're not asking. Darryl Green sounds like a reassuring weatherman on a regional news programme and a much more sensible name, if you ask me, than all of the other ones we've had so far today. And finally, Sital, or is it Sital? All in lowercase. Very, very mysterious. Anyway, those fine, upstanding individuals are members of Smashing Security Plus, which means that they get their episodes ad-free, earlier than the general public, and perhaps most importantly, get their names read out at the end of the show. If you would like to join them, all you've got to do is head over to smashingsecurity.com/plus, where for the cost of maybe a fancy coffee every month, you too can be publicly mocked by me. And so all that's left for me to do is to say thank you very much, and I hope you'll tune in again next week for another episode of Smashing Security. Thank you.</v>
